Conventional secret sharing schemes, such as Shamir's secret sharing scheme, cannot prevent the leak of shares when they are deposited on servers. In contrast, in an asymmetric secret sharing scheme, the owner of the secret has a stronger authority than the server, and the number of servers storing the share can be set to less than k. Therefore, even if all the shares stored in the server leak, the secret is not leaked. This can prevent the leakage of secrets from attacks on servers. In the conventional secret sharing scheme, a correct secret cannot be reconstructed if the attacker outputs a false share at the time of reconstruction by hijacking the server. This problem cannot be addressed even if asymmetric secret sharing is used. Therefore, we extend the asymmetric secret sharing scheme in a manner enabling the owner to detect a secret when an attacker outputs a false share. In the proposed scheme, a server is not required to store information other than the share if n > k. In other words, no burden is imposed on the server for verification. In addition, the hijacked servers can be identified under certain conditions, realizing an efficient verification method for secrets that is suitable for the asymmetric secret sharing scheme.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the utilization of big data using cloud computing has garnered attention for the creation of new businesses, including e-business. Cloud computing can distribute and store a user's data in a virtual mass storage consisting of multiple servers on a network, called cloud, and access the data from anywhere through the network as required by the user. However, when data are deposited in the cloud, the data must be encrypted to render it resistant to information leakage. In addition to encrypting and storing data, a function of the secret calculation capable of performing arithmetic processing while concealing individual data using concealed data distributed and stored in the cloud is required. Use of the secret sharing scheme as a method of realizing such data concealment and concealment calculation has garnered attention. In secret sharing, the original secret is distributed into n pieces, called share, and can be reconstructed by collecting k (k ≦ n) shares.
However, from the less than k shares, no secret. The (k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme (hereinafter called the Shamir scheme) by Shamir is well known as one of these secret sharing schemes (Shamir, 1979) . A conventional secret sharing system, including the Shamir scheme, consists of n data servers that store shares, a dealer that distributes a secret, and a restorer that restores the secret. That is, at the time of distribution, the owner of the secret distributes it as a dealer or the distribution of the secret is requested from a dealer who appears only at the time of secret distribution. The dealer then performs a secret distribution operation to calculate the n shares. The shares are stored separately in n data servers. The restorer can reconstruct the secret by collecting k shares among the distributed n shares.
However, k servers are attacked without the secret owner's knowledge because the conventional secret sharing systems cannot prevent k or more shares from being collected; hence, the shares are leaked, and the secret is reconstructed. A scheme, called asymmetric secret sharing scheme (Takahashi and Iwamura., 2014) ; (Takahashi and Iwamura, 2013) ; (Sarathi Roy et al., 2014) , was also proposed. In this scheme, the owner can generate up to k − 1 shares from one key. In the secret sharing schemes other than the asymmetric secret sharing scheme, each server is generally equal, and the owner cannot prevent the secret from being leaked from the server. In contrast, in the asymmetric secret sharing scheme, if the owner has more authority than the server, and the number of servers storing the share is less than k, the secret will not leak even if all the shares stored in the server are leaked. That is, k or more shares are not leaked unless the owner generates the share from one key; hence, the owner of the secret can prevent the share leakage by managing the key safely.Therefore, the asymmetric secret sharing scheme is secure against secret leakage; however, a problem that occurs is that an attacker can output a false share at the time of reconstruction by hijacking the server. The restorer cannot reconstruct the correct secret, and the secret cannot be verified. This problem cannot be solved even if the asymmetric secret sharing scheme is used.
Meanwhile, the verification method of the reconstructed secret in the conventional secret sharing scheme often contains extra information, called authenticator, other than the share to verify the reconstructed secret. Consequently, a problem arises involving an increase in the amount of information managed by the server (Cabelllo et al., 2002) ; (Ogata and Araki, 2013) ; (Ogata and Satoshi, 2013) ; (Hoshino and Obana, 2015) ; (Zhu, 2017) .
In addition, these methods often cannot calculate in any finite field; therefore, the convenience is low. In many verification methods, servers exchange shares and authenticators and calculate to verify the secret using their information at the time of reconstruction, thereby increasing the amount of communication and number of calculations (Al Mahmoud, 2016) . Thus, as a verification method that does not use the authenticator, the method with tamper resistance using public key cryptography exists (Takahashi and Iwamura., 2014) . However, attacks against this are limited to the chosen ciphertext attack, and the attacker repeatedly sends his/her own fake ciphertext to the server and analyzes the message and timing returned by the server to obtain the secret key and plaintext. Therefore, the conventional verification method for secrets is not efficient and often not applicable in any case.
We propose herein an efficient verification method for secrets by extending the asymmetric secret sharing scheme. The extension is realized by enabling the owner to generate not only the shares, but also the server ID from the key. This allows the owner to verify the restored secret even if the attacker outputs a false share. Additionally, if n > k, each server is not required to store information other than the shares; that is, no burden is imposed on the server for verification. Furthermore, when k + u servers exist, all the attacked servers can be identified if the number of e servers that outputs a false share is u > e. As mentioned earlier, our verification method for secrets having less calculation and communication, which can specify the fraudulent server is realized.
Section 2 describes various conventional methods for verifying the recovered secret; Section 3 presents the related works required to understand our proposed scheme; Section 4 denotes the details of Proposed Scheme 1, where no information other than the share is required when n > k. (Ogata and Araki, 2013 ) is generated as an authenticator. However, they cannot be calculated in any finite field.
CONVENTIONAL METHOD
In particular, in the scheme described in (Cabelllo et al., 2002) , the probability of an attacker's success is 1 when = 2 . For example, if an attacker uses false shares for the secret and the authenticator, false secret ′ = + ∆ and false authenticator ′ = + ∆ are reconstructed. In this case, the attacker must set ′ = ( ′ ) 2 , such that the fraud is successful. However, the attacker can always realize∆ = ∆ 2 when = 2 .
Therefore, the probability of the attacker's success is 1. This method is less convenient because the bit string used by the computer is often an element of GF (2 ). Another problem is that the storage capacity of each server increases by storing the share of the authenticator. Similarly, in the case of the method in (Ogata and Araki, 2013) , when = 3 , the convenience is increased compared to the method in (Cabelllo et al., 2002) because the attacker's success probability is 1; however, it also has a restriction on the finite field in addition to storage capacity increases.
First Section Authenticator Method for Bit String Decomposition of Secret (Ogata and Satoshi, 2013); (Hoshino and Obana, 2015)
Split the secret s on GF (2 2 ) in half, divide the bit string s = (s 1 ,s 2 ) ∈ GF(2 n ) , and distribute secret s and authenticator ′ = s 1 •s 2 using the secret sharing scheme. If the recovered secret ′ and the authenticator ′ are ′ = s 1 •s 2 , the information restored is valid. If they do not match, the information restored is invalid. This cannot be applied to arbitrary bit sequences. In the scheme presented in (Ogata and Satoshi, 2013) , it is valid only when the bit length is even, and the secret is ∈ (2 2 ). In addition, the method in (Hoshino and Obana, 2015) decomposes a secret into N bits; however, it is effective only when ∈ (2 ) , and cannot set an arbitrary bit sequence. Furthermore, the storage capacity increases because each server required information other than the shares of the secret.
Authenticator Method using Functions and Random Numbers on Share (Zhu, 2017)
The random number b and ( ) are generated in addition to the polynomial ( ) of the k − 1-th equation related to the secret s. The shares of ( ) and ( ) are distributed to each server. Additionally, at the time of restoration, the restorer restores ( ) and ( ) using Lagrange's interpolation formula. Subsequently, if a random number b exists that satisfies ( ) + ( ), the secret s is restored. However, a secret can be found by most k − 2 attackers instead of k − 1. As mentioned in Section 1, an authenticator exists in addition to the sharing of ( ) and ( ). Therefore, the storage capacity of the server is increased.
Method of Broadcasting Authenticator (Al Mahmoud, 2016)
Each server divides the received share = ,0 + ,1 . Each server stores ,1 , and ,0 is the information for verification. Each server prepares ( ) of the k − 1 linear expression such that (0) = ,0 . Furthermore, each server uses the random numbers holds. If it holds, then ,0 is correct, and each server restores the secret S.
Method using Public Key Encryption (Takahashi and Iwamura, 2014)
Assuming an attacker, called overlap-joint tampering, the attacker can additionally obtain shares that are not subject to tampering as input. In addition, the purpose of the attacker is to use the decryption oracle, receive a share of a certain message m, and generate a share that can be reassembled into a message related to m. It performs a selective ciphertext attack, but supports it using a secure public key cryptosystem (IND-CCA secure). It offers computational security; however, it is limited to the selected ciphertext attack, and the number of attackers is not concretely shown.
PRELIMINARIES

Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme
[Share Generation] Calculate n shares from a secret s and distribute the shares to n servers. Hereinafter, the calculation is performed with the following prime number p as a modulus:
Choose an arbitrary prime number p such that s < p and n < p.
Select different n values from and set server ID 1 , … , . From , k −1 random numbers 1 , … , −1 are generated, and the following k − 1-order polynomial ( ) is created.
Substitute n server ID 1 , … , for ( ) and calculate n shares 1 , … , .
Distribute shares to each server. Server IDs 1 , … , are public information.
[Reconstruction] Let ( = 1,2, ⋯ , ) be the share used for reconstruction. Furthermore, let ( = 1,2, ⋯ , ) be the server ID corresponding to the share.
The restorer collects k ( , ) and obtains s using the Lagrange's interpolation formula.
Lagrange's Interpolation Formula
Let ( = 1,2, ⋯ , ) be the server ID. In general, is public information, and is a share output from each server. Therefore, if the share output from k servers and its server ID are known, the following equation is obtained, and secret s can be obtained by substituting = 0. 
That is, not the secret , but the incorrect secret ′ is reconstructed such as follows:
Furthermore, if the server ID 1 , … , used in the Lagrange's interpolation formula is known, the attacker can continuously manipulate false secret ′ . For example, if the server transmits false share + ∆ for the first time, and the server transmits false share + ∆ for the second time, the secret is reconstructed as follows:
At this time, the attacker can adjust ∆ and ∆ according to Eqs. (7) and (8) such that the difference between ′ (0) and ′′ (0) becomes 0. In this case, false secret ′ = ′ (0) can be repeatedly restored.
Asymmetric Secret Sharing Scheme
The asymmetric secret sharing scheme is a secret sharing scheme in which the owner of the secret uses pseudorandom numbers generated using the key as the shares. The asymmetric secret sharing scheme has been proven to exhibit computational security depending on the encryption method.
( , ) is used.
[Asymmetric Secret Sharing Scheme]. Select t servers (t < k) from n servers, and call these a key server. The key server contains no share, and contains only a key to generate pseudorandom numbers. The n − t servers other than the key server are called data servers, and they store the calculated shares. However, n − t < k. Furthermore, the owner with a secret has one key _ , and all keys of the key server are generated from _ . Additionally, [ ]( = 1, … , ) is assigned to m secrets 1 , … , for data identification.
( , ) represents the encryption of using key . (Takahashi and Iwamura, 2014) .
[Share Generation] The owner generates t keys ( = 1, … , ) for t key servers using _ as follows:
The owner generates a pseudorandom number as follows using the data identifier [ ] of the secret . ( = 1, … , ) are shares of .
The owner determines 
The owner calculates the remaining shares +1 , … , using Eq. (1) with the determined coefficients and sends and [ ] to the data servers ( = + 1, … , ).
[Reconstruction] The restorer, who reconstructs the secret , selects any k − t server from the n − t data servers and sends the data identifier [ ] of the secret to the selected server.
The selected data server sends share corresponding to [ ] to the restorer. The restorer requests t shares to the owner. When the owner permits the restorer to restore, ( = 1, … , ) is generated from the _ using Eq. (9), and the pseudorandom number is generated from Eq. (10) to be sent to the restorer.
The restorer who receives share and pseudorandom numbers reconstructs secret using the Lagrange's interpolation formula.
PROPOSED SCHEME
The attacker can set the difference between the false secrets shown in Eq. (7) to 0 because he can calculate ( ) = ∏ ( − ) ≠ using public server ID . Therefore, we extend the asymmetric secret sharing scheme in which the owner can generate and hide only the share, to enable the owner to generate and hide the server ID of the key server as well. However, the server ID of the data server is public. Furthermore, the extended asymmetric secret sharing scheme as the proposed scheme 1 assumes > .
Extended Asymmetric Secret
Sharing Scheme 1 (N > K)
[Share Generation]
1. The owner generates two sets of t key server's keys ′ and ( = 1, … , ) using _ as follows, where is a constant, and | is a concatenation of and .
2. The owner generates pseudorandom numbers and using the data identifier [ ] of the secret .
3. The owner uses generated in 2 as the server ID ( = 1, … , ) for the key server and as the share of .
4. The owner performs processing 3-5 using in Share Generation, as shown in Section 3.3. The owner sends +1 , … , to the data server.
[Reconstruction and Verification]
1. Let = + (0 < ) ). The restorer who reconstructs the secret sends the data identifier [ ] of the secret to all data servers. 2. The data server sends the shared corresponding to [ ] to the restorer. 3. The restorer requests t shares to the owner. 4. When the owner permits the restorer to restore, ′ and ( = 1, … , ) are generated from using Eq. (13), and and are generated from Eq. (14).The owner then sends them to the restorer. 5. The restorer changes the k − t combinations received from the data server and reconstructs secrets in addition to the t sets of and generated by the owner. Furthermore, he verifies that the reconstructed results match each other. If all results do not match, all recovered secrets are not adopted. The matched reconstruction results are adopted.
Security Verification
As shown in Section 3.3, the owner can control the generation of shares in the asymmetric secret sharing by securely managing their own key: hence, k shares will not be leaked without the owner's knowledge. Similarly, in the case of the extended asymmetric secret sharing scheme 1 shown in Section 4.1, k shares will not be leaked without the owner's knowledge because the owner must give permission at the time of reconstruction. Therefore, the security concerning share leakage can be regarded the same.
The feature of extended asymmetric secret sharing scheme 1 is that the server ID is created and concealed by the owner. Consequently, an attacker who is not permitted to reconstruct will not know the server ID used to generate the share; therefore, he cannot manipulate the difference between the reconstructed secrets, as shown in Eq. (7).
Therefore, even if the attacker manipulates the share from to + ∆ , the difference between all the reconstructed secrets cannot be made to match. As a result, the unmatched secrets are not adopted as incorrect values.
We will explain the principle of security for verification using simple examples. For simplicity, we assume herein that the owner is a restorer. For example, in the case of = 3, = 4, = 2, = 1, in the Share Generation process, the owner generates and hides server ID 1 = 1 , 2 = 2 and the corresponding share from the key. The server ID of the data server is 3 , 4 (publicly known). Consider a case in which two data servers 3 and 4 are hijacked by an attacker at the time of reconstruction, and false shares 3 + 3 , 4 + 4 are the output.
In this case, the combination of the two shares received from the data server is changed, and restoration is performed twice. The first time, secret is reconstructed by the combination of 1 , 2 , 3 , and the second time is reconstructed by the combination of 1 , 2 , 4 . Here, 1 and 2 are the server IDs generated by the owner, which the attacker is unaware of. In this case, ′ (0) is reconstructed the first time, and "(0) is reconstructed the second time as follows:
"(0) = + 4 (− 1 )(− 2 ) ( 4 − 1 )( 4 − 2 )
Here, even if 3 and 4 are hijacked by the same attacker, the attacker does not know 1 and 2 and cannot set 3 and 4 as ′ (0)= "(0).
That is, if ( ) is the entropy for , then
However, the example above is the case of = 1, and although it is understood that a false share is the output, the incorrect server cannot be identified. Next, if = 4, = 6, = 3, and = 2 , three data servers exist, and three shares can be used for verification. Here, when 5 is hijacked and outputs a false share 5 + 5 , the secrets reconstructed using other correct shares are identical because 4 = 6 = 0, and the secret reconstructed using the share of 5 is a different value from the others. In this case, an invalid data server 5 can be identified.
As the second example, when two data servers are hijacked, all the reconstructed secrets are invalid because they do not match. Therefore, assuming that is the number of data servers that output false shares, if − ≧ 1, an unauthorized server can be identified, and if − ≧ 0, an unauthorized server cannot be identified, although it can verify fraud.
Furthermore, when the restorer is not the owner, the restorer who is permitted to restore a certain secret , knows the key server IDs 1 = 1 , 2 = 2 , but the key server ID is for each i, which is different. Therefore, even if an attacker knows the key server's ID and shares regarding a secret, it cannot be applied to other secrets.
In addition, the extended asymmetric secret sharing scheme 1 has no restrictions on the finite field because the secret is used as it is and not divided. Tables 1 and 2 show the comparison between the proposed scheme 1 and the conventional methods. In Tables 1 and 2 , "secret" implies the restriction on the secret, and the maximum number of attackers implies the maximum number of servers that can be hijacked. In the proposed method 1, the maximum is − 1 because − < . In evaluation, (Cabello et al., 2002) and (Ogata and Satoshi, 2013) are representative in 2.1 and 2.2 and compared with the proposed scheme 1. The method shown in 2.5 uses public key encryption; hence, the amount of calculation is large, and the assumed attack is different from those of other methods. Therefore, the comparison is omitted herein.
EVALUATION
From Table 1 , the proposed scheme has less data stored by each server, and it is also possible to detect unauthorized servers.
In addition, only the proposed method is not limited as to the prime number that is the module in calculation. Tables 1 and 2 shows that the proposed scheme only requires the share compared to the other method, and the secret and prime number used are not restrics.
PRACTICALITY
Currently, individuals and companies are big data societies with a lot of information. There are two ways to save data: 1) using the on-premises type servers owned by each individual, and 2) using the cloud type servers deposited in a virtual environment on the Internet.
Recently, individuals and many companies have begun to use data storage systems such as MicrosoftAzure, -Google Drive, and iCloud.
However, data on the cloud are the target of malicious attackers and the leakage of customer information has been in the news multiple times.
When a secret sharing scheme is used to protect customer information, schemes other than asymmetric secret sharing have no means of preventing information leakage.
Therefore, as an example of application of our proposed extended asymmetric secret sharing scheme, we use it to protect customer information. In this case, the customer, as the owner, distributes their information using the extended asymmetric secret sharing scheme, and manages keys securely. If the number of shares deposited in the data server is k-1 or less, the customer information is protected even if the information stored in all the data servers leaks. In addition, it is possible to efficiently confirm whether the restored information has been falsified by our extended asymmetric secret sharing scheme.
Therefore, the proposed scheme realizes safe and low-cost customer service.
CONCLUSIONS
We proposed herein extended asymmetric secret sharing schemes to verify secret reconstruction at > .
By concealing the server ID, we secured against attack using the weak point of the Lagrange's interpolation formula. Consequently, our schemes can show the legitimacy of the reconstructed secret by performing u + 1 times or 2 times the reconstruction without using special functions, such as an authenticator. Furthermore, the server held only the share for which > , and the secret and the finite field used were not restricted.
